NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

REVIEW BOARD

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
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ENFORCEMENT SECTION. DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY,

Complainant,

vs.

DIELCO CRANE SERVICE, INC.,

Respondent.



Docket No. LV 10-1402

DECISION (REISSUED)

This matter having come before the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD at a hearing commenced on the 11th day of August, 2010, in furtherance of notice duly provided according to law, MR. JOHN WILES, ESQ., counsel appearing on behalf of the Complainant, Chief Administrative Officer the Occupational of Safety and Administration, Division of Industrial Relations (OSHA); and MR. ROBERT PETERSON, ESQ., appearing on behalf of Respondent, Dielco Crane Service, Inc.; the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD finds as follows:

Jurisdiction in this matter has been conferred in accordance with Nevada Revised Statute 618.315.

The complaint filed by the OSHA sets forth allegations of violation of Nevada Revised Statutes as referenced in Exhibit "A", attached thereto.

Citation 1, Item violation of RECEIVED 29 1, alleges a **CFR**

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1910.180(h)(3)(v). The employer was charged with hoisting, lowering, swinging or traveling while anyone is on the load or hook. The violation was classified as "Serious" and a penalty was proposed in the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS (\$3,500.00).

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Citation 1, Item 2, alleges a violation of 29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(vi). The employer was charged with carrying loads over people. The violation was classified as "Serious" and a penalty proposed in the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS (\$3,500.00).

Counsel for the complainant through Safety and Health Representative (SHR) Renato Magtoto presented evidence and testimony as to the violations and appropriateness of the proposed penalties. Magtoto testified that he conducted an inspection at a worksite in Las Vegas, Nevada based upon information and reports that the respondent was operating a crane lifting employees and guests for a company called Dinner in the Sky (hereinafter "Dinner"), which was providing a unique aerial dining experience. SHR Magtoto arrived at the site on or about September 25, 2009 and observed employees of respondent, Dielco Crane Service, Inc., preparing a crane for a lift. He also observed the loading of employees and customers of Dinner onto a platform connected to the crane hook, and hoisting of the Dinner employees and customers, approximately ninety (90) feet in the air. He obtained photographs and completed his investigation, interviews and report. Exhibit "1" was admitted in evidence and identified as the investigative report consisting of pages 1 through 10. Exhibit "2" was admitted in evidence consisting of photographs obtained by SHR Magtoto itemized as 1 through Exhibit "3" was admitted in evidence identified as an OSHA interpretation letter consisting of pages 1 through 4. Exhibit "4" was

admitted in evidence and identified as an additional OSHA interpretation letter, pages 1 through 4.

Mr. Magtoto issued Citation 1, Item 1, alleging a violation of the specific standard applicable to crane operations at 29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(v). He determined that respondent created and was responsible for the recognized hazard based upon the "multi-employer worksite doctrine", even though no respondent employees were exposed on the platform structure lifted by the crane. He testified that the table (platform) weight, lift elevation and employee load constituted the serious danger of exposure to fall hazards by Dinner employees working as food and beverage servers. He further testified that no employees of respondent were lifted on the elevated platform or exposed to the subject fall hazard.

At Citation 1, Item 2, SHR Magtoto testified he cited respondent for violation of 29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(vi). He observed an employee of respondent working under the "canopy load" attached to the crane hook. He determined there to be a specific violation of the referenced standard because the respondent employee identified as a "rigger" was working under the load. SHR Magtoto testified as to photographic Exhibit 2, item 5, which depicts the respondent employee standing under the load. He testified that he interviewed the individual who identified himself as an employee of respondent. Exhibit 2, item 6, depicts the same identified employee under the load attached to the crane during a lift. Exhibit 2 photo number 7 depicts the respondent employee working under the "canopy/load" while it was on the hook attached to the crane.

Mr. Magtoto testified as to the hazards associated with working under a load attached to a crane hook specifically prohibited by the

cited standard. He stated the hazard associated with the work is based upon a potential fall of the canopy/load assembly attached to the hook which weighed approximately one ton.

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The SHR testified with regard to employer knowledge and the serious nature of the hazard and violation as the aerial dining operation had been ongoing since June, approximately 4 months prior to the date of the inspection and citation. He further testified the crane operator was "in charge of the job" as the management employee on the site representing the respondent. He determined the operator, and therefore by imputation respondent, "created and/or controlled" the fall hazards under the multi-employer worksite doctrine which exposed both its own employee (i.e. the rigger) as well as employees of Dinner.

On cross-examination, SHR Magtoto testified respondent was cited in item 1, because it "created" the hazardous conditions for the Dinner employees. He further testified that the person in direct control of the crane was the crane operator, an employee of respondent, even though the operator was under the general direction of the Dinner company personnel.

At the conclusion of complainant's case respondent presented evidence and testimony through Mr. Bill Cunningham, who identified himself as an engineer for respondent. Mr. Cunningham testified as to the applicability of 29 CFR 1926 to construction sites and 29 CFR 1910 to general industry. He reviewed the Federal OSHA interpretation letters in evidence and responded to questions regarding standard applicability.

On cross-examination Mr. Cunningham testified that 29 CFR 1926.550 is the applicable standard to be referenced for protection of the subject employees. He testified that ". . . hoisting employees is

prohibited . . . except for lifting in the basket if necessary . . . to complete the work effort. . ." Mr. Cunningham admitted on cross-examination that the standard was developed for the construction industry to address the need where an employee must be lifted by a crane to perform some special effort which cannot otherwise be accomplished to complete the work task. He further testified that an employer simply cannot hoist people just because, for example, they do not want to walk to a particular location.

At the conclusion of respondent's case, counsel for complainant and respondent presented closing argument.

Complainant argued at Citation 1, Item 1, that the core issue for finding of a violation is whether the standard applies to the facts in evidence. Counsel asserted that Exhibit 3, page 1, second paragraph of the Federal OSHA interpretation letter, did not provide any employer with authority to lift people which is recognized as inherently dangerous. He argued that Dinner employees were exposed and not those of respondent, therefore the standard cited is appropriate as there could be no 29 CFR 1926.550 case. He argued that respondent created a fall hazard by permitting its crane operator to lift employees of another employer and therefore liable for the violative exposure under the multi-employer worksite doctrine. Counsel further argued the respondent cannot defer its liability by asserting compliance with a contractual commitment which is not a recognized defense under occupational safety and health law.

Counsel argued at Citation 1, Item 2, that use of the words "shall" or "should" is not determinative of citation validity as to the charging allegations of violation. The photographic exhibits and the testimony clearly established respondent's employee was working as a rigger under

the load attached to the crane hook in violation of the cited standard. The work area was not a construction site therefore the cited standard for general industry was appropriate and applicable.

Respondent argued in its closing argument at Citation 1, Item 1, there were no respondent employees on the lifted platform or otherwise exposed to the fall hazards charged to establish a violation of the cited standard. He argued the respondent did not "create" or "control" the hazardous conditions, but rather merely provided a crane and operator to the worksite subject of direction by the Dinner company representatives who were in control of the project. Counsel further argued that the well settled case law does not permit the respondent employer to be cited for a violation under the facts nor was it a creating or controlling employer as contemplated by the law to warrant confirmation of a violation at Citation 1, Item 1.

Counsel concluded arguing that the standard cited at Citation 1, Item 2 is flawed and the charging violations rendered meaningless by substituting the word "shall" for the word "should".

In all proceedings commenced by the filing of a notice of contest, the burden of proof rests with the Administrator. See N.A.C. 618.788(1).

All facts forming the basis of a complaint must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See Armor Elevator Co., 1 OSHC 1409, 1973-1974 OSHD 116,958 (1973).

To establish a prima facie case, the Secretary (Chief Administrative Officer) must prove the existence of a violation, the exposure of employees, the reasonableness of the abatement period, and the appropriateness of the penalty. See Bechtel Corporation, 2 OSHC 1336, 1974-1975 OSHD ¶18,906 (1974); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 1 OSHC 1219, 1971-1973 OSHD ¶15,047. (1972).

A "serious" violation is established in accordance with NRS 618.625(2) which provides in pertinent part:

employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations or processes which have been adopted or are in use at that place of employment unless the employer did not and could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know the presence of the violation.

At Citation 1, Item 1, the respondent is charged with exposing the employees of another employer to hazardous conditions it created and/or controlled under what is known as the "multi-employer worksite doctrine". Respondent Dielco acted as subcontractor to Dinner under a contract. Dielco provided a crane, an employee/operator and an employee/rigger to a site leased by Dinner. The Dielco employee/operator was routinely instructed by Dinner to lift Dinner employees (and guests) on a platform to approximately 90 feet in the air by use of the crane. No employees of Dielco were exposed to the hazardous condition of being located on the elevated platform.

To reach a determination regarding exposure to employees of other than the cited employer, the threshold issue before the board is whether the subject worksite constitutes a multi-employer worksite as defined by applicable occupational safety and health law.

Historically, the multi-employer worksite doctrine was carved out of case law and originally applied only to multi-employer construction sites where typically multiple employers were working and cross-over responsibilities created disputed employee exposures, hazards, citations and enforcement problems. See Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill Construction Corp.), 513 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1975). The federal commission and courts developed what became generally known as the Anning Johnson rules. See, Anning-Johnson Co., 1975-1976 OSHD ¶ 20,690, at p. 24,779, 24,783. In Brennan, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that:

". . . it would impose liability on a subcontractor who **creates** a hazard or who has **control** over the condition on a **multi-employer construction site** even though only employees of other subcontractors are exposed . . ."

In <u>Beatty Equipment Leasing</u>, Inc. V. Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept. <u>Of Labor</u>, 557 F.2d 534, 6 OSH Cas. (BNA) 1699, 1978 OSHD (CCH) P 22,899, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled:

". . . policy is best effectuated by placing responsibility for hazards on those who create them."

"Typically a construction site job will find a number of contractors and subcontractors on the worksite whose employees mingle throughout the site while work is in progress. In this situation, a hazard created by one employer can foreseeably affect the safety of employees of other employers on the site . . . We therefore conclude that on a construction site, the safety of all employees can best be achieved if each employer is responsible for assuring that its own conduct does not create hazards to any employees on the site and imposing liability on this basis would not place an unreasonable or unachievable duty on contractors. Citing Grossman Steel and Aluminum Corp., No. 12775, 4 OSHC 1185 (May 12, 1976), and Anning-Johnson Co., Nos. 3694 and 4409, 4 OSHC 1194 (May 12, 1976), with regard to multi-employer construction sites."

". . . we specifically adopt the court of appeals decision in <u>Brennan v. OSHRC</u> (Underhill Construction Corp.), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975), to the extent that it would impose liability on a subcontractor who creates a hazard or has control over the condition on a multi-employer construction site even though only employees of other subcontractors are exposed."

In 1996 the Federal Review Commission (OSHRC) expanded the multiemployer construction worksite doctrine beyond construction sites to multi-employer worksites in general. In <u>Rockwell International Corp.</u> 17 OSHC 1808 No. 11 (1996), the Review Commission recognized that while multi-employer worksite defenses originally arose in the context of construction, they are also applicable in other areas of employment where there are frequently a number of different employers working at the same time.

employees to workplace hazard requires threshold proof of a multiemployer worksite. A determination of the number of employers to
establish a multi-employer worksite is a case of first impression for
this board. Nevada law and the Occupational Safety and Health Act place
the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence upon the complainant
to establish exposure to a cited employer's employees. However the case
law expands liability to a cited employer for exposure of other
employers' employees provided the site is a multiple employer worksite.
In Rockwell, supra, the commission provided guidance on multi site
employment to be ". . . areas where there are frequently a number of
different employers working at the same time . . ."

While certainly a multi-employer site consists of more than one, the facts and evidence in the subject case demonstrate there were only two contractors on site, i.e. Dinner and the respondent Dielco Crane. The case law confirms the focus of the courts and federal review commission to cover situations where a number of contractors and/or subcontractors are on a worksite whose employees mingle throughout the site. Further, evidence must establish the cited employer created or controlled a hazardous condition to its employees or those of another employer. The control of the overall operation and creation of the unique worksite conditions were in Dinner not respondent. Multi-employer worksite conditions under governing law did not exist here based upon the facts in evidence. There is limited legal precedent to provide guidance and no definition of a worksite occupied by two contractors as meeting the criteria for application of the multi-

employer worksite doctrine. However, the rationale in <u>Rockwell supra</u> is to the contrary. The board is unable to apply the multi-employer worksite doctrine to the subject facts to satisfy the legal burden of proof.

Based upon the above and foregoing, as matter of fact and law, there was no hazard exposure to employees of the cited respondent at Citation 1, Item 1 established by a preponderance of evidence. The board is without facts, evidence or controlling law to find a violation. There was no preponderance of evidence that respondent had controlling authority over the unique worksite conditions. Without "creation and/or control" of any hazard by the subcontractor respondent employer at the worksite and threshold evidence of a multi-employer site, the extension of liability to an employer for exposing the employees of others to hazards cannot be found.

At Citation 1, Item 2, the facts in evidence establish a single employee of respondent identified as a rigger performed work under the canopy associated with the spreader bar attached to the crane hook.

29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(vi) provides that "the operator should avoid carrying loads over people." (Emphasis added) The evidence established that only the rigger employee of respondent was exposed to an overheard load. There was no competent evidence that any other employee of respondent nor those of Dinner or "people" were exposed to overhead carrying of the load. The evidence demonstrated that to properly "rig" the specialized canopy structure and spreader bar, the rigger was required to position himself under the "canopy" assembly while it was attached to the crane hook prior to a lift. The evidence established that only the rigger was at some time under the "load" while performing his work task to rig the assembly but prior to "carrying the load".

There was no "carrying of the load over (other) people. The citation must fail when measured by the specific terms of the standard. Had the standard been mandatory and proscribed that an employer shall not carry loads over people then perhaps, unless a distinction could be made for an exception to the rigger who by necessity must perform his work, the citation might have been supportable; however because the terms of the standard were permissive providing only that the ". . . operator should avoid carrying loads over people", the governing case law does not permit the finding of a violation when a standard is advisory in nature. Standards derived from advisory sources are only advisory in nature as well as standards which are framed with the use of the word "should".

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". . . The Commission and reviewing courts have previously examined similar problems arising under other standards and have concluded that standards adopted under section 6(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(a), that are derived from advisory source standards are advisory under the Act. Marshall v. Union Oil of California, 616 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Annaconda Co., 596 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1979); A. Prokosch & Sons Sheet Metal, Inc., 80 OSAHRC, 8 BNA OSHC 2077, 1980 CCH OSHD P24,840 [*7] 76-406 and 76-576, 1980); General Dynamics Corp., Electric Boat Division, 80 OSAHRC, 8 BNA OSHC 1360, 1980 CCH OSHD P24,416 (No. 78-3290, 1980); Interlake, Inc., 80 OSAHRC, 8 BNA OSHC 1414, 1980 CCH OSHD P24,453 (No. 78-2462, 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 77 OSAHRC 811 C10, 5 BNA OSHC 1495, 1978 CCH OSHD P23,056 (Nos. 10611, 11327 & 14366, 1977), aff'd sub nom. *Marshall v. Pittsburgh Des-Moines Steel Co.*, 584 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp., 76 OSAHRC 811 A2, 4 BNA OSHC 1400, 1976-77 CCH OSHD P20,860 (no. 5958, 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977); McHugh & McHugh, 77 OSAHRC 351 A2, 5 BNA OSHC 1165, 1977-78 CCH OSHD P21,629 (No. 13010, 1977); United States Steel Corp., 77 OSAHRC 641 C8, 5 BNA OSHC 1289, 1977-78 CCH OSHD P21,795 (Nos. 10825 & 10849, 1977)." (Emphasis added)

The board in reviewing the factual evidence and testimony finds that the complainant failed to meet its burden of proof to establish the serious violation of the cited standard alleged at Citation 1, Item 2.

Based upon the above and foregoing, it is the decision of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD that no violations of Nevada Revised Statute occurred as to Citation 1, Item 1, 29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(v) and Citation 1, Item 2, 29 CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(vi). The violations and proposed penalties are denied.

The Board directs counsel for the respondent to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD and serve copies on opposing counsel within twenty (20) days from date of decision. After five (5) days time for filing any objection, the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be submitted to the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD by prevailing counsel. Service of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the Chairman of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD shall constitute the Final Order of the BOARD.

DATED: This 0% day of January 2011.

NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD

TIM JOMES, Chairman